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It’s Not Easy Being Green: The Effectiveness of Environmental Provisions in Preferential Trade 
Agreements 
Maggie Rose1 
 
I. ABSTRACT 
 Do environmental provisions actually have an effect on the environmental quality of a 
state? Trade and the environment have a complicated relationship, as states don’t have a concrete 
way to resolve environmental issues that are associated with gains from trade—increased 
avenues for pollution, threatened conservation efforts, and the lack of incentives to improve 
environmental quality threaten a state’s abilities to address environmental threats. However, the 
inclusion of environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements provides both an 
economic and legal incentive to improve environmental quality. In this paper, I argue that 
environmental provisions have a positive quantitative effect on the environmental quality of the 
state. Numerous qualitative studies lend support to the hypothesis, but a large-N quantitative 
study has never been attempted to establish a general link. This was tested using a multivariate 
regression on a led variable. The results showed that environmental provisions actually had a 
negative effect on the environmental quality of the state, due to what was theorized as a weak 
commitment to environmental improvements and the negative effects of trade on the 
environment. The lead on the variables was also tested, and showed that as the lead increased, 
the coefficients increase and the effect of environmental provisions have a larger positive effect 
on the environmental quality as time increases between measurement and the agreement coming 
into force. 
                                                        
1 It takes a village to write a thesis, and so some acknowledgements are in order. I would like to thank Scott Adler for saying I 
should write this thing in the first place; David Bearce for working with me and for all the tea and guidance (this would be 
impossible without him); Murat Iyigun for agreeing to be on this weird senior’s defense committee; Megan Roosevelt for help 
with Stata and teaching the course in IPE; Joe Jupille, Moonhawk Kim, and Rainer Volkamer for help with data collection and 
general encouragement; Kim-Lee Tuxhorn for introducing me to the wonders of political economy and teaching me how to do 
research; and the Pentequila Gang, the Political Science Thesis Writers, The Dirty Blondes, Anna-Elise Smith, and Evan Graser 
for letting me complain and tease out ideas and reading my drafts even when they had literally no idea what I was talking about. 
You all are magnificent. 
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II. RESEARCH PUZZLE AND INTRODUCTION 
 Do environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements actually have an effect on 
the environmental quality of a state? Especially in recent years, states have been negotiating 
preferential trade agreements. These agreements give preferential access to markets of goods and 
services to the signing countries, which can increase trade overall and provides another 
institutional framework for trade liberalization. Several of these trade agreements have additional 
provisions that deepen the scope of the agreement—countries can include additional dispute 
settlement mechanisms, human rights provisions, labor standards, and, most importantly for the 
scope of this paper, environmental provisions. While these provisions are potentially a good 
solution to the issues surrounding trade and the environment, it is questionable whether or not the 
provisions actually have an effect. 
 If these provisions do indeed have an effect, they have important implications for many 
of the questions that have plagued the relationship between trade and the environment. While the 
WTO has a Committee on Trade and the Environment and has stated its commitment to 
sustainable development (World Trade Organization 2015), many environmental groups argue 
that increased gains from trade and a lack of a clear institutional policy on the environment make 
it easy for polluters to continue destructive activities and threaten conservation efforts (“Trans-
Pacific Partnership,” The Sierra Club). Governments cannot solve this problem by taking direct 
action against environmentally harmful actors. 
 This is excellently illustrated in the infamous Dolphin-Tuna Case, brought to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994. The United States adopted an embargo on 
Mexican tuna. Oftentimes in the Pacific Ocean, schools of dolphins swim above schools of 
yellowfin tuna. When fishermen harvest tuna, dolphins are sometimes caught in the nets and die 
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if they are not released. The US Marine Mammal Protection Act explicitly forbids the “taking” 
of marine mammals in excess of US standards, and when dolphins are caught in the nets of the 
tuna fishermen and subsequently killed, it is in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
Therefore, the US imposed an embargo on Mexican tuna because of excess dolphin murders 
(Mexico etc. versus US: “Tuna-Dolphin”). The GATT dispute settlement body ruled that the 
US’s embargo of Mexican tuna violated GATT rules, as the US could not take action on the 
process of tuna harvesting, only on the finished tuna product; the body also stated that the US 
could not impose its own laws on another state, even when plant, animal, or human health is in 
harm’s way. 
 Environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements seek to circumvent this 
conundrum. By placing safeguards for the environment specifically within the text of a 
preferential trade agreement, a state can adapt to the rules that exclude process and production 
methods. They can potentially exact real environmental change by using economic incentives to 
create measures for environmental improvement. I argue that environmental provisions in 
preferential trade agreements have a positive effect on the environmental quality of a state. 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Trade and the Environment 
 It is first helpful to examine the relationship between trade and the environment in the 
literature so as to gain a clearer picture of why environmental provisions matter. One such 
finding of interest involves what has been referred to as the “Environmental Kuznet’s Curve.” 
This plots the relationship between income and environmental degradation, resulting in an 
inverse-U shape. In low-income countries, environmental degradation is low, because these 
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countries don’t have industries that pollute, or industry in general. In high-income countries, 
environmental degradation is also low, because they have the capacity and the will to rectify 
environmental damages. It is in industrializing, middle-income countries that environmental 
damages are highest, because they are trying to gain a competitive edge in the global market. The 
effects of the Environmental Kuznet’s Curve only increase when trade is involved, because 
countries seek to increase income and productivity when they are involved in the global 
exchange of goods and services (Frankel and Rose 2004).  
 Incomes generally rise with trade and therefore, according to the Environmental Kuznet’s 
curve, environmental degradation should decrease. This is the case in middle-income countries 
that are growing more prosperous; however, for low-income industrializing states that are trading 
far more rapidly than most other states (Andrade 2009) this is not usually the case. Because of 
the lack of infrastructure frameworks or human capital to ensure that pollution remains low, low-
income countries can easily turn into polluters because they want growth and the benefits of 
higher incomes at a faster rate than environmental quality. While this results in negative 
externalities (poorer environmental quality), the microeconomic effects from trade, 
industrialization, and specialization (cheaper prices, better products, better jobs, increased human 
capital, etc.) far outweigh the consequences (Harris 2004). There is, therefore, no domestic 
incentive to improve environmental quality while liberalizing trade and increasing income during 
industrialization. 
 Environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements can potentially create an 
incentive when there is not one inherent in rational behavior. If a state wants to further liberalize 
its markets, there is an incentive to sign onto PTAs, which give it preferential access to large and 
powerful trade partner’s markets. Therefore, a more powerful state has the leverage to extract 
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certain concessions from the industrializing state in a trade agreement, which can take the form 
of provisions. Provisions in preferential trade agreements, then, provide an incentive for an 
industrializing state to improve its environmental quality, even when it runs parallel to its 
industrializing goals—a state doesn’t want to lose out on preferential access to a trading partner’s 
market, so it will comply with environmental provisions in an agreement. 
2. Rational Design in Trade Agreements 
 It is also helpful to examine the design of preferential trade agreements, because states 
can shape these agreements according to their priorities. Environmental provisions in trade 
agreements are a manifestation of these priorities, especially for Western industrialized states, 
and the rational design of their trade agreements. 
 Recent research into the design of preferential trade agreements utilizes rational design 
literature as a pillar for their analysis. Rational design theorists posit that trade and institutions 
are based on states constructing them in order to suit their own interests and serve their own 
ends. Rational design theorists also posit that institutions seek to reduce uncertainty about 
contracting in an anarchic world. 
 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) are often cited with regard to rational design 
literature. Their paper argues that states can make agreements more desirable in prospect and 
more robust in practice by varying negotiation and duration provisions—provisions that may 
include environmental provisions. Environmental provisions make the agreement desirable for 
developed states and their domestic publics because they ensure cooperation on environmental 
affairs—a state can deny access to its market if the environmental quality of its contracting 
partner is less than desirable. Developing states agree to these provisions because additional 
negotiation provisions deepen the integration to an attractive, large market (Chaffour and Maur 
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2004). A state is free to refuse the provisions or not follow them, but the cost of noncooperation 
is larger for a developing state than it is for a developed state. 
 In this vein, cheating on these agreements’ environmental provisions is theorized to be 
less likely, due to the adverse economic effects due to noncompliance. States have to care about 
future payoffs and expect that future interactions are likely enough to deter cheating. Institutions 
and agreements extend these future payoffs, proved through a game theory approach (i.e. 
increased iterations make states more cooperative). Cooperation, then, is reached because states 
expect future interactions with a powerful trading partner (Fearon 1998). States can then make 
the rational choice to include an environmental provision in the bargaining phase (based on their 
original preference), and the threat of trade sanctions, stoppage of trade flows, or a costly dispute 
settlement phase will deter the incentive to cheat on these provisions in the long run. 
 Lastly, it is questionable whether or not provisions in trade agreements have a tangible 
effect on the domestic activities of the states at all—the central question of this paper. Luckily, 
rational design theorists have studied this as well. The NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism 
was used as an example of how nations seek to extend their own interests when entering 
international agreements and international institutions (Goldstein 1996). There was a question as 
to why a powerful state would sign onto an agreement that favors a less powerful state, and it 
was concluded that domestic interactions at the institutional and bureaucratic level start to shape 
the treaties that states sign onto. This provides a reason for an industrialized state to sign onto an 
agreement containing an environmental provision with a developing state. The industrialized 
state sees an opportunity to extend its own interests—improving environmental quality. It is also 
noted that domestic changes as a result of NAFTA are important to consider—the United States 
significantly altered its behavior towards Canadian petitions for protection directly as a result of 
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an international trade agreement (Goldstein 1996). It therefore stands that an environmental 
provision in an international trade agreement could cause similar changes in domestic behavior. 
 
IV. THEORY 
 Trade and the environment’s complicated relationship make it difficult for gains to be 
made simultaneously in both spheres. Trade liberalization does present the problem of the “race 
to the bottom” with respect to environmental affairs—countries trying to gain a competitive edge 
on the global market can end up making irresponsible environmental choices. If a profit is to be 
made, environmental standards will be relaxed. Likewise, multilateral environmental agreements 
lack the enforcement or clout to make concrete environmental progress.  
 Therefore, states need an appropriate way to improve the environment while 
simultaneously liberalizing trade. In recent years, many industrialized nations, including the 
United States, the European Union trading bloc, Australia, and Japan, have sought to address this 
question in the negotiations of their preferential trade agreements. Occasionally, states seek to 
enhance the scope of these agreements by including certain provisions within the text of the 
agreement. Many of provisions in the negotiations deal with the environment—stopping trade 
when it interferes with human, animal, or plant health, placing regulations on how nonrenewable 
resources are handled and processed, creating institutions domestically to deal with 
environmental practices, developing sustainable fishing practices, and the conservation of 
forests, coral reefs, and other ecosystems during the production phase.  
 Because there is a direct and tangible economic cost of noncompliance to these 
agreements (denial of market access, lengthy dispute settlement negotiations, stoppage of trade 
flows, etc), countries will be more likely to follow these environmental provisions, improving the 
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environmental quality of the state. This also creates an incentive for developing states to improve 
their environment where there was no inherent incentive—by removing the temptation of the 
“race to the bottom,” countries can manage their environment more responsibly while 
simultaneously liberalizing trade and gaining access to important markets. 
 The distinction between hard law and soft law is key to this argument—an agreement is 
considered “hard law” if the agreement provides regulations and a basis for interpreting the laws. 
Most trade agreements, especially those signed in recent years, fall under this interpretation 
(Abbott and Snidal 2000), while most multilateral environmental agreements fall under soft law 
(as they lack the clout to enforce the agreements). It follows that there is both an economic and 
legal incentive to follow environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements. 
 These incentives have been tested at the domestic level. Most of the literature deals with 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1994 by the Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States. This agreement has a separate chapter on the environment, establishing the 
North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (NACEC), which monitors the 
environment of each country and encourages cooperation between the states.  
 Prior to 1994, Mexico in particular came under fire for their abuse of the environment, 
with rampant air and water pollution in its cities and irresponsible plant enforcement of existing 
regulations. After NAFTA’s implementation, however, the environment began to improve 
marginally—plants enforced regulatory standards, air pollution began to clear, and water quality 
began to improve. While the causality is somewhat disputed between consumers wanting 
products that were environmentally friendly (Gallagher 2004) and NACEC’s supervision 
(Hufbauer et al 2005), the case of Mexico is proof that economic and environmental gains can be 
made under trade simultaneously. 
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 Several more case studies on environmental provisions have been made over the years. 
The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), for example, placed an environmental provision 
in its trade agreement. Although the governments failed to make a legal structure to support the 
enforcement of the provision, each of the participating state governments (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay) made the environment a national directive and have seen marginal gains 
(Hochstetler 2003). While the provision itself was not entirely effective, the norms it created 
within the MERCOSUR community were observed to percolate to the domestic level. This may 
undermine support for the hypothesis’s direct relationship, but it does show that environmental 
gains are possible with environmental provisions (albeit in a roundabout way). 
 Meanwhile, Japanese environmental provisions in trade agreements are not exceedingly 
deep in their scope, but they still need to be agreed to in order to gain preferential access to 
Japan’s large, protectionist market (Yanai 2014). This further lends credence to the theory that 
market access will motivate states to improve their environmental quality. EU and US initiated 
provisions, on the other hand, are far more legalistic and contain references to other multilateral 
environmental agreements (Jinnah and Morgera 2013). This strengthens existing environmental 
agreements and provides the hard law basis for environmental quality improvements. 
 Overall, most of the analysis of environmental provisions in trade agreements seems to 
support to the theory that economic and integrative incentives for compliance make 
environmental provisions more likely to improve environmental quality (Hochstetler 2003, 
Hufbauer et al 2005). Likewise, many qualitative studies of environmental provisions in trade 
agreements also support the theory that provisions lead to improved environmental quality 
(Colyer 2004, Colyer 2012, Bourgeois et al 2007). However, not a single large-N quantitative 
study has been performed on the effects of these provisions. It should follow that if small-scale 
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qualitative studies hold up to scrutiny, a large-scale quantitative study should yield the same 
results on a macroscopic scale. Therefore, I hypothesize that environmental provisions in 
preferential trade agreements should have a measurable quantitative effect on the environmental 
quality of the state. 
 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Hypotheses 
 Two hypotheses are being tested for this paper, and read as follows: 
H1: Preferential trade agreements containing an environmental provision are associated 
with improved environmental quality. 
H2: Preferential trade agreements containing both an environmental provision and a 
dispute settlement mechanism are associated with larger improved environmental quality 
than only having an environmental provision. 
2. Variables 
 The dependent variable for each hypothesis is environmental quality. The independent 
variable for H1 is the existence of a preferential trade agreement with an environmental 
provision, and the independent variable for H2 is an interaction effect with the existence of a 
PTA with an environmental provision and a dispute settlement mechanism. The unit of analysis 
is country-year (it).  
 Environmental quality is measured using Yale and Columbia’s Environmental 
Performance Index, which creates an index of overall environmental performance using a 
combination of air quality, conservation efforts, water quality, and pollution. The data is taken 
from the 2014 EPI Report, which took data from the 2012 dataset and projected data back to 
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2002 for 178 states. The data ranges from 0 (worst environmental quality) to 100 (best 
environmental quality), and changes only slightly with an upward trend as an aggregate whole as 
time goes on. It is one of the best indices of environmental quality that is also broken down into 
the appropriate units of analysis, which was critical to testing a quantitative study. 
 The main independent variable, environmental provisions, measures how many 
environmental provisions have been signed onto and the scope of said provisions. This is by far 
the most difficult variable to measure, as no one has done a comprehensive study on these 
provisions. No dataset exists that codes for them. To obtain data, agreements in Kucik’s 2012 
dataset on the design of trade agreements (as well as agreements that entered into force between 
2009 and 2012, which were not covered in the dataset) were read and coded if there was an 
environmental provision first. The agreements containing an environmental provision were then 
further analyzed for the scope of the provision. 0 indicated no environmental provision. 1 
indicated that the provision only occurred in the preamble of the agreement. 2 indicated that the 
provision occurred in the main body of the text but were only included as a general exception for 
the stoppage of trade. 3 indicated the provision occurred in a specific article in the text, which 
oftentimes covered the most scope. 4 indicated the provision had its own specific chapter in the 
agreement. After coding, the scopes of the provisions were then summed for each year for all the 
countries in the Environmental Performance Index. A country with a large environmental 
provisions score therefore not only signed onto more agreements, but also had a greater scope of 
the provisions. 
 Because a country needs to first sign onto a preferential trade agreement to have an 
environmental provision, the number of preferential trade agreements was also coded. Data for 
this also came from the Kucik dataset. The total number of PTAs per year for each country in the 
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Environmental Performance Index was summed and added to the dataset. This number of PTAs 
also took into account agreements that were signed before 2002 but are still in force, agreements 
that have become defunct since 2002, and states that signed onto an agreement after it went into 
force (the latter mostly applies to countries in the EU, which has enlarged since 2002). It did not 
code for agreements that were defunct before 2002. 
 Another independent variable, indicated in the second hypothesis, is the dispute 
settlement mechanism. Kucik 2012’s dataset contained a variable for a dispute settlement 
mechanism, and coded either 0 for no dispute settlement mechanism or 1 if the agreement 
contained a dispute settlement mechanism. The number of dispute settlement mechanisms per 
year for each country in the Environmental Performance Index was summed and added to the 
dataset. In theory, one could also code for the scope of the DSMs, but they vary a great deal less 
than the environmental provisions. 
 A number of control variables were also selected for this project. GDP per capita was 
taken from data obtained by the World Bank, measured in US Dollars as of the 2014 value. This 
was chosen as a control because of the effects of the environmental Kuznet’s curve as discussed 
in the literature review. Polity was taken from the Polity IV Project by the Center for Systemic 
Peace, which controls for the political development of a country (as democracies are more likely 
to have a higher environmental quality). This ranges from -10 as the most autocratic regime (i.e. 
North Korea, China), and 10 as the most democratic (i.e. the United States, the United 
Kingdom). The measures between the two extremes are states with some mix of autocratic and 
democratic institutions (i.e. Russia, Venezuela, Malaysia). Surface Area was taken from data 
obtained by the World Bank, measured in square kilometers. This was chosen as a control 
because environmental benefits are more disperse if the country is larger (especially with regard 
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to air quality). Urbanization was also taken from data obtained by the World Bank, and measures 
the percentage of people living in cities. This was chosen as a control because more urbanized 
states are more likely to have poorer environmental quality overall (due to the effects of more 
motor vehicles and concentrated populations in a smaller space). Trade is a measure of a 
country’s sum of manufacturing imports and exports as a share of the real GDP with 2014 as the 
base year, and represents an indicator of both market size and the economic strength of the 
country. Manufacturing was chosen because manufacturing imports and exports are more likely 
to have a direct impact on the environmental quality of a state (due to the production methods 
being more likely to pollute based on low in-state controls on emissions and pollution). Data for 
this control came from the World Trade Organization’s 2012 annual report. Multilateral 
environmental agreements codes for the number of MEAs a country has in force during in a 
given year. This is a measure of a prior, soft-law commitment to the environment. Data is pulled 
from the University of Oregon’s International Environmental Agreement Database Project.  
3. Model Specifications 
 A linear regression model will be used to analyze the results of these variable 
interactions. My regression is based on Emile Hafner-Burton’s 2005 paper “Trading Human 
Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression,” which 
measured the repression of human rights by governments with the independent variable as the 
inclusion of human rights provisions within free trade agreements. Based on her model (also 
using country-year as the unit of analysis), the regression will read as follows for H1: 
EQit+3 = β0 + β1EQit + β2PTAit + β3PTAEPit + β4PTADSMit + β5DEMit + β6pcGDPit + β7AREAit 
+ β8URBAN + β9TRADEit + β10MEAit 
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 EQ is environmental quality, and is led by three years to see if the quality of the 
environment changes over time as a result of the environmental provision. Three years is a 
somewhat arbitrary value, because any provisions will take time to have an effect; however, 
three years has a larger sample size (because with a lead, the number of observations in a 
timeseries dataset drop out). PTA is the number of PTAs that have been signed, which should 
have a zero effect; PTAEP is the scope of environmental provisions that have been signed which 
should be positive and significant; and PTADSM is the number of dispute settlement mechanisms 
that have been signed onto, which (in this model) should also have a zero effect. The controls 
should theoretically have a zero effect. DEM is the polity score, pcGDP is the GDP per capita, 
AREA is the surface area, URBAN is the urbanization level, TRADE is the trade flows, and MEA 
is the number of multilateral environmental agreements signed onto. Fixed effects are also added 
to this model to account for country-specific variables that are not controlled for in the model 
(i.e. environmental advocacy groups, activist culture, etc). 
 The second model for H2 is the same as the first, but instead adds an interaction effect for 
environmental provisions and dispute settlement mechanisms: 
EQit+3 = β0 + β1EQit + β2PTAit + β3PTAEPit + β4PTADSMit + β5DEMit + β6pcGDPit + β7AREAit 
+ β8URBAN + β9TRADEit + β10MEAit + β11(PTAEP*PTADSM)it 
 The eleventh beta coefficient is the interaction effect, which is expected to be positive. 
Because of the interaction effect, PTAEP and PTADSM should have a statistically insignificant 
effect and remain positive. However, the addition of β11 and β3 should be positive, larger than the 
β3 value in H1, and significant. All other coefficients have the same predictions. This model 
likewise uses country-specific fixed effects. 
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VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Preliminary Notes on the Dataset 
 The dataset, while only covering ten years of data, contains 1958 independent 
observations with a fair amount of variance. 325 observations have no environmental provisions 
in place, while 1633 observations have one or more environmental provisions signed onto. The 
max number of provisions signed in preferential trade agreements is 22; Switzerland, Norway, 
and Iceland all have this number. Most EU countries, Singapore, Japan, the United States, EFTA 
states, and Chile have all signed onto ten or more agreements containing environmental 
provisions. The mean scope of the provisions is 9.882 with a minimum of zero and a maximum 
of 53. The mean of the environmental performance index is 49.548 with a minimum of 14.51 and 
a maximum of 88.79. The standard deviation of the EPI is 16.50. Both the minimum and the 
maximum of the EPI fall within 3 standard deviations of the dataset, which doesn’t indicate a 
large spread of the data or any outliers. 
2. Multivariate Regression Results 
Both Model 1 (H1) and Model 2 (H2) were regressed on a three-year lead. The results are 
illustrated below. 
Table of Results: 
Variable Model 1 Results Model 2 Results 
Environmental Quality 0.270  
(0.083)* 
0.268 
(0.083)* 
PTA -0.029  
(0.075) 
-0.031 
(0.075) 
Environmental Provisions -0.032 -0.021  
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(0.021) (0.022) 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism 0.098 
(0.078) 
0.139 
(0.080) 
Polity -0.010 
(0.035) 
-0.011  
(0.035) 
GDP per capita 0.000012  
(.0000181) 
0.0000105  
(0.0000181) 
Surface Area 1.20E-06  
(6.73E-07) 
1.03E-06  
(6.91E-07) 
Urbanization 0.096 
(0.043)* 
0.082 
(0.046) 
Trade  19734.73  
(86743.14) 
20528.82 
(83907.44) 
Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements 
0.008 
(0.002)* 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
Interaction Effect (DSM*EP) N/A -0.00133 
(0.0006)* 
Table of Results: N=1277 observations, model clusters by state with fixed effects. Cells contain 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, with * indicating statistical significance at 
p≤0.05. 
 
3. Inter-Model Comparisons 
 The results of this statistical analysis provided some surprising results. For both models, 
multilateral environmental agreements was the only variable that remained statistically 
significant including the interaction effect. This is wholly surprising and undermines some of the 
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assumptions made in the hypothesis—it was assumed that MEAs would not have the legal clout 
to have a measurable effect on the environment and were instead largely symbolic gestures for 
environmental protection. However, these models and this data suggest otherwise. While it is a 
small measurable positive effect (0.008 out of 100 is less than 1% improvement in environmental 
quality), it is indeed a measurable and statistically significant positive effect. It could be due to 
the sheer number of MEAs that were coded for and consequently signed onto (states sign onto an 
average of 105 MEAs); however, it suggests that perhaps MEAs deserve to be taken more 
seriously on their ability to enact positive environmental change.  
 The other variable that retained statistical significance across both models was the non-
lead EPI variable. Given that the dependent variable was regressed on this variable, it is 
unsurprising that it retained statistical significance and does not warrant further explanation.  
4. Model 1 Results 
 The first model directly contradicts the hypothesis that was postulated in the theory—
environmental provisions actually have a negative effect on the environmental quality of the 
state. The negative result, however disconcerting it may be, is not statistically significant and is 
also quite small—0.032 is a small negative effect on a dataset spreading from 0 to 100. Even 
between 14.51 and 88.79, this is still less than a one percent decrease in environmental quality. 
This may be due to several factors. 
 One possibility is that the failure to confirm the hypothesis is a purely data-based failure. 
It may be that the timeseries isn’t long enough to see an observed positive effect on the 
environmental quality and that the environment getting worse is just a factor of the dataset in this 
particular time period. Another possibility is that the dataset doesn’t account for domestic 
policies that were enacted, as seen in the case of MERCOSUR. The domestic policies and laws 
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concerning environmental improvement are not accounted for in a performance-based metric like 
the EPI; this may also be due to the fact that domestic laws created under the influence of a 
preferential trade agreement take longer to come into force, which may not be encompassed by 
the lead. While this paper did attempt to examine exactly a performance-based assessment, it 
may be possible that these provisions have other effects than simply performance-based 
successes. This gives some hope for the hypothesis to be true in some capacity that is not 
captured by the data in use. 
 Another possibility is that trade itself makes the environment worse, as mentioned in the 
literature review. Preferential trade agreements mean that markets are opened further for certain 
countries, and naturally trade should increase between the states privy to the agreement. 
However, the trade coefficient, counted as a control, has a very large positive effect on the 
environmental performance—in fact, this non-statistically significant coefficient is the largest 
effect of all. While this does lend support that rising incomes with trade lead to improved 
environmental quality (as predicted by the Environmental Kuznet’s Curve), it more likely lends 
credence to the idea that this is a data-based failure. By coding trade as manufacturing imports 
and exports as a share of real GDP, the mean value of the trade statistic is 6.97E-07, which is 
incredibly small. It is therefore unsurprising that a one-unit increase in trade would yield an 
exponentially large increase in environmental quality. 
 However, the other trade variable that was coded for is the number of PTAs that have 
come into force between 1969 and 2012. This coefficient is also seen to be negative and not 
statistically significant, but supports assertions made in the literature review in that trade makes 
the environment worse. As previously stated, preferential trade agreements increase the amount 
of trade flowing between states that are allowed preferential market access, so it is plausible that 
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trade makes the environment worse due to rapid increased production of polluting industries, or 
increased production from industry for the first time. Environmental provisions do almost 
nothing to combat this problem using this explanation—their inclusion may be too optimistic or 
purely symbolic. 
 By coding for the number of PTAs signed onto, however, it is possible that the effect of 
the environmental provisions is masked. This is because having an environmental provision is 
conditional to being a member of a PTA—the independent variable is not fully independent, 
which is one of the problems inherent in the model itself. More statistical tests could in theory be 
run; however, this is outside the extent of my statistical training and could not be performed in 
this thesis. 
 It is also possible that the provisions are indeed simply boilerplate language built into the 
trade agreements in order to appease domestic constituents that find fault with trade for making 
environmental quality worse (Putnam 1988). The inclusion of these provisions do occur mostly 
in states that have active environmental lobbies—most EU countries and the United States in 
particular have groups that actively oppose trade deals for being too lenient on environmental 
standards (Tobey 1990). These provisions may be a way to silence the active lobbies and get the 
treaties ratified.  
 These provisions also tend to occur within treaties between industrialized states and states 
with already poor environmental quality, which provides a reverse-causality story—industrial 
states are more likely to include an environmental provision in an agreement with a state that 
already has a poor environmental quality in order to enact positive change. It does not 
completely seem to be working because the poor environmental quality of some states may be 
tipping the scales in the negative direction. Likewise, regional agreements like SADC and 
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Mercosur, modeled on regional agreements between initially high-income and environmentally 
friendly states like the European Union treaty, seem to be the only places where environmental 
provisions occur between middle- and low-income states with mediocre environmental quality. 
This may be an example of scripting, in which certain institutional forms propagate through the 
world without a clear commitment to actually enforcing them (Meyer et al 1997). The provisions 
are therefore there in form, but lack a concrete functional outcome that is rigorously followed. 
5. Model 2 
 Model 2 also fails to confirm the hypothesis postulated—trade agreements with both a 
dispute settlement mechanism and an environmental provision have a statistically significant 
negative effect on the environmental quality of the state at the 95% confidence level. The 
negative effect is likewise incredibly small (less than a 1% decrease in quality) but it retains 
statistical significance. When added to the environmental provisions coefficient, this result is, 
however, larger (i.e. less negative) than the H1’s coefficient, so that part of the hypothesis does 
hold up.  
 The World Trade Organization has one of the most complex dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the realm of international organizations, but less than five disputes have been 
filed at the panel about issues of environmental protection or safety, and less than ten disputes 
have been filed under both the WTO and its predecessor GATT dispute settlement mechanism 
(World Trade Organization 2016). This suggests that countries often do not actually file disputes 
about environmental violations. The same logic may be applied to dispute settlement 
mechanisms in trade agreements—it’s likely that very few cases are actually filed about 
environmental violations, although the data on this is incredibly hard to find. States simply may 
not choose to punish other states on the basis of harming the environment. 
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 This phenomenon is likely due to the effect of the tragedy of the commons—because the 
environment is a public good, no state government wants to bear the costs of regulating and 
policing other states. This is especially tricky due to the fact that there are numerous benefits to 
continue exploiting the public good—cheaper products, more jobs, and increased development 
all come at the cost of poor environmental quality. No states want to take the lead and police 
because they also have gains from environmental degradation. Because there is virtually no 
enforcement mechanism, environmental quality keeps worsening.  
 The inclusion of environmental provisions in trade agreements is, as suggested in the 
theory, an attempt to make incentives (preferential market access) to improve the environmental 
quality of the state. However, the lack of action makes it difficult to confirm environmental 
provisions as anything other than boilerplate language. Even in the face of a dispute settlement 
mechanism, environmental quality gets worse, indicating that there is an overwhelming incentive 
towards noncompliance. 
6. Testing the Lead 
 One of the potential reasons for the failure to confirm each hypothesis was that the 
timescale for the provisions to take effect was not long enough. It was therefore a useful exercise 
to test the lead on each of the variables. Both H1 and H2 were regressed on varying leads, and 
their coefficients were graphed below against the number of years that were led, with data in 
Table 1 of the Appendix. Model 1’s relevant IV was the environmental provisions, while Model 
2’s relevant IV was the environmental provisions linearly combined with the interaction effect 
between dispute settlement mechanisms and environmental provisions. The latter was multiplied 
by the average number of dispute settlement mechanisms that were signed onto (6). 
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 Model 1’s trend (equation y=0.049x-0.0387, R2=0.15947) does display an upward-
sloping, weakly correlated linear relationship between the lead year and the coefficient. All but 
one lead year have negative values for their coefficients (year 8), but the trend of the data 
suggests that it gets less negative as more years pass between the entry into force and when the 
environmental quality is measured. This could be a function of the number of observations 
dropping out as time goes on (each year of lead, you lose more data), but it does lend support to 
the theory that the timeseries was not long enough to see a measurable positive effect on the 
environmental quality of the state. 
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 Model 2’s trend (equation y=0.0068x-0.0409, R2=0.25511) is somewhat different. While 
most terms seemed to be nearly identical to their coefficients in Model 1, they were all slightly 
higher. When regressed on a nine-year lead, the coefficient became positive. The correlation 
between number of years passing between ratification and measurement is stronger for Model 
2’s coefficients than it is for Model 1’s coefficients, and the increase as time goes on is more 
pronounced. This is also indicative of confirming H2 over time—agreements with both an 
environmental provision and a dispute settlement mechanism seem to have a greater impact on 
the environmental quality of the state. While these results may also be a function of observations 
dropping out as the lead increases, it does indicate that H2 can be confirmed both for the 
specified model and over time. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 The relationship between trade and the environment is a valuable thing to study—as the 
world becomes more globalized and interconnected, humanity’s impact on the environment is 
only going to increase. Rules at the World Trade Organization over process and product methods 
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and nondiscrimination prevent states from taking action in their trading techniques when the 
environment is at stake. However, in recent years, preferential trade agreements have been 
proliferating rapidly through the world and offer a new way to rectify environmental damages—
environmental provisions within the texts of these agreements are increasingly being integrated 
into the trading system. 
 It was therefore worth questioning whether or not environmental provisions in 
preferential trade agreements had an effect on the environmental quality of the state. In this 
paper, I argued that environmental provisions would be associated with improved environmental 
quality; I also argued that these effects would be higher if the agreement also contained an 
enforcement mechanism in the form of a dispute settlement. It was theorized that these 
provisions create an incentive to improve the environmental quality of a state without risking its 
economic development. Because access to markets is conditional on the provisions outlined in 
the trade agreement, states will be more likely to follow the goals outlined in the text of the 
agreement. These provisions include those on the environment, and so a state will be more likely 
to develop sustainable industries and improve its environmental quality—the economic costs of 
noncompliance are too great to risk cheating on the agreement.  
 Ultimately, my predictions did not come to fruition. Both hypotheses were tested using a 
linear regression model, and both the hypothesis focusing solely on environmental provisions 
and the hypothesis focusing on both environmental provisions and a dispute settlement 
mechanism (for enforcement) were found to have a negative impact on the environmental quality 
of the state according to the metric used in this paper. Neither result was statistically significant 
and both constituted a very small decrease in environmental quality; however, the results failed 
to confirm the hypotheses presented. This was theorized to be because the data used did not 
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encompass policies that were created at the domestic level—the metric was purely a 
performance-based measure and didn’t account for increased efforts in the domestic political 
sphere. Trade itself was also shown to make the environmental quality of a state worse (which is 
widely examined in the existing literature), and these provisions fail to have an effect on the 
environment at all. The provisions may have been placed there to placate domestic 
environmental groups, and are not enforced because largely states tend to engage in dispute 
settlement if a purely economic interest is at stake. The environment does not provide many 
opportunities to make a profit, and so there aren’t any cases brought to courts. Lastly, no one 
wants to hold the burden of enforcing environmental regulations because the benefits of 
continued noncompliance extend to all parties. 
 The leads on the effect of the provisions were also tested, and both models provided 
evidence for increased environmental quality as the lead is extended into the future. These results 
generated an upward-sloping trend to the data that reflected an improvement in the coefficients 
as time increased. It was therefore possible that the models did not have a long enough lead on 
the data to give a positive result and the provisions take longer to come into effect than was 
theorized initially. However, it is also possible that these results are due to the fact that the 
sample size gets smaller as the lead gets larger.  
 Overall, environmental provisions were found to be simply boilerplate language that does 
not have an effect on the environmental quality of the state—they even seem to make the quality 
worse due to increased trade. This isn’t seen in other areas of provisions because there’s no one 
to bear the costs—human rights provisions and labor provisions have agendas that extend 
through the world and have global regimes dedicated to their improvement. The environment 
does not have this luxury—NGOs from Western, industrialized states seem to have the most 
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influence. The UN’s recent Climate Summit provides some hope for increased environmental 
cooperation, but the incentive structure discourages action. This study did find that multilateral 
environmental agreements had a positive, statistically significant impact on environmental 
quality, and so it is possible that alternate mechanisms are going to have a better effect on 
improving the environmental quality of states. Further research may be needed to confirm this, 
but in any case, time seems to be the biggest factor. 
 However, just because a large-scale result is not seen does not mean that environmental 
provisions should be abandoned—change happens slowly but surely in the environmental realm. 
A quantitative result may not be immediately available; however, if countries keep adopting 
these solutions to an insurmountable problem, change could be seen in the long run. The 
qualitative studies done mostly on NAFTA suggest an impact over time. In the complicated 
relationship between trade and the environment, any effort to reconcile the two should be 
applauded. 
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